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FOREWORD 
The objective of this report is to provide the NRC with a prelimina ' 
overview of a portion of the approach we are developing for Task 3 
of the Load Combination Project. More details and examples of results 
will be provided in future reports. 
This report was developed through the efforts of a team consisting of 
M. K. Ravindra (Sargent & Lundy), C. A. Correll (Professor of Civil 
Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), J, Collins 
(J. H. Wiggins Company), R. P. Kennedy (Structural Mechanics Associates) 
and C. K. Chou, K. Vepa, P. 0. Smith, and R. Mensing of Lavvrence Livermore-
Laboratory. In keeping with the spirit of the technical approach used 




This is the first interim report giving the results to date on the 
development of a load combination methodology. After a brief background, 
the objectives and scope of the load combination methodology task are 
listed. This is followed by user oriented requirements on the methodology. 
The proposed methodology is then introduced and simply demonstrated. 
Examples of similar applications of the reliability based methodology 
are presented in Section 6 and accompanied by a listing of some of the 
unique considerations in applying this type of methodology to nuclear 
design. A fairly detailed exposition of a component reliability and 
design code optimization scheme is given along with a brief discussion 
of system and plant reliability considerations. 
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Current load combination criteria have been developed on a conservative 
and somewhat subjective basis. The probability of occurrence and conse­
quences of events have been considered in formulating these criteria, 
but not as completely as possible. Studies have been conducted to 
address portions of load combination issues, but a unified approach has 
never been undertaken. Consequently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and the nuclear industry have differed on criteria, on a number of 
occasions. The issues are too complex to develop convincing arguments 
for adopting or modifying portions without a comprehensive approach which 
is removed from immediate licensing questions. In some cases, positions 
have been adopted which result in increased plant costs or other problems 
at some later date when they are applied to new load combinations or 
conditions. 
The NRC and the industry need a unified approach to load combination. 
This approach must evolve from a rational procedure to determine what 
loads need to be combined, how, and at what service level or structural 
load category. The broad aspects of this approach should be such that 
botn the NRC and the industry agree it would resolve the issues, if 
adopted and developed. The approach should be systematic so areas of 
disagreement can be isolated, and focus p-ovided to resolve the disagree­
ment. 
The basic problems that need to be addressed are: 
1. What loads should be considered as concurrent; what response 
should be combined? 
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2. What factors should be applied to load effects or responses? 
3. What are appropriate service levels, load categories, and 
stress limits? 
4. How should responses be combined. 
1.2 Objective and Scope of the Load Combination Methodology 
Development Task 
The objectives of the load combination methodology development task are to: 
1. Develop a methodology for appropriate combination of loads or 
responses for nuclear power plant design under normal plant 
operation, transients, accidents, and natural hazards. 
2. Establish design criteria, load factors, and component service 
levels for appropriate combinations of loads or responses to 
be used in nuclear power plant design or design review. 
The scope of the project covers the following: 
• Review and evaluate existing industry and NRC requirements 
for treating loads and load combinations. 
• Identify the problems in combining loads, 
• Develop a methodology for establishing subsystem and/or 
reliability based on system or nuclear power plant reliability 
requirements. 
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• Develop a methodology for relating probability of component 
failure to the design criteria for components of a nuclear 
power plant. 
• Demonstrate the load combination methodology for some representa­
tive components and subsystems. 
• Assist the NRC in revising the Standard Review Plan and in 
developing regulatory changes. 
1.3 Definitions 
Listed below are definitions of several terras which are important for 
understanding the topics discussed in this report. 
1. Event: An environmental, accidental or operation condition 
which is to be considered in design. 
2. Load: Effects associated with an event exclusive of the 
influence of properties of structures, systems and components 
such as mass, stiffness and damping; the input to a static 
or dynamic analysis. 
3. Response: Effects of loads computed either by a static or 
dynamic analysis and including the influence of properties of 
structures, systems and componnets such as stiffness, mass 
and damping; the output of a static or dynamic analysis 
4. Component: The smallest unit whose design is regulated by a 
by a single specific part of the applicable design code. 
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5. Limit State: An undesirable condition oi a unit. Limit states 
may be grouped by different levels of implications and, hence, 
by different degrees of undesirability. Examples of different 
limit states are: 1) a unit may continue to function but be 
sufficiently damaged to require replacitent* 2) a unit may 
remain structurally intact but fail to function, and 3) a unit 
may experience catastrophic failure. 
6. Limit State Probability: The probability that the defined 
undesirable condition exists. 
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2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The ASME code for component design has not traditionally specified which 
loads should be combined. On the other hand loads are combined in recent 
ACI and AISC codes. The combinations in these codes were not completely 
accepted by the NRC, thus, load combinations for structures are specified 
instead in the Standard Review Plan (SRP). Load combinations for mechan­
ical components h;jve evolved but are not included in the SRP. The 
differences in philosophy in structural and mechanical design have their 
counterparts in the resulting load combination criteria for structures 
and equipment. The following paragraphs give some examples of load 
combinations, these differences, and identify issues that need to be 
addressed. 
2.1 Pressure Retaining Equipment 
The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, 
Nuclear Power Plant Components (ASME Code), governs the design of vessels, 
pumps, valves, piping, steel containment and component supports. The 
ASME Code defines six conditions for load combinations; Design, Service 
Levels A, B, C, and D, and Testing. The philosphy in the ASME Code 
is to place limits on stress for these conditions for which various 
unfactored load effects are combined. The four service levels allow 
combinations of loads of increasing severity and decreasing probability 
of occurrence to be placed in separate categories with different stress 
limits. Load combinations are specified by the designer for the six 
conditions. Thus, the combinations are not included in the code, and 
they may vary from component to component and plant to plant. The code 
also allows limit and inelastic analyses for Service Levels C and D in 
lieu of stress limits based on linear analysis. 
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The ASME Codo differentiates between primary, secondary, and peak stresses. 
Secondary and peak stresses must be addressed for Design and Testing 
Conditions, and Service Levels C and D (with exceptions). 
The primary stress limits must be met for design conditions and all 
service levels for metal containment structures. Typical load combina­
tions for Service Levels B and D for a BWR are: 
Level B = Normal Pressure + Dead Weight + OBE + Safety Relief 
Valve Discharge. 
Level D = LOCA Pressure + Dead Weight + SSE + LOCA Dynamic 
Effects. 
Combinations for Level B have a relatively-high probability of occurrence 
and the component should survive them without damage. Since Service 
Level B assumes a high probability of occurrence, it might be justifiad 
to specify that the combination of OBE and SRV with normal loads is a 
Service Level C combination. However, the code implication is that 
Level C loads may cause some damage while Level B loads may not. 
Additionally, loads may take different forms, e.g., the OBE load is 
vibratory whilf the SRV load is pulsatory. There is some small proba­
bility that responses to both loads wi?l be phased in time so the peak 
responses will coincide. Further, the responses to dynamic loads may 
not be as damaging as those for static loads, because of the limited 
energy content of the dynamic loads. All these factors need to be 
considered in determining the service level. 
For Service Level D, the primary requirement is to safely shutdown the 
plant. The probability of occurrence of an earthquake-induced large 
LOCA is believed to be extremely low. The probability of peak responses 
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to LOCA and earthquake loads occurring simultaneously is even lower so 
the combination of SSE and LOCA way not be required. However, this load 
combination is prudent provided the resulting design does not increase 
risk from normal operating conditions. 
2.2 Structures 
The design of structures is governed by the ACI and AISC codes. Both 
codes use elastic working stress design (WSD) and load factor design 
(LFD) criteria. The codes do not distinguish between primary (load 
controlled) and secondary (displacement controlled) stress, and load 
and displacement controlled conditions are included in load combinations 
wh'-ih are then compared to load controlled limits. 
The SRP specifies load combinations for safety-related structures. The 
ACI and AISC codes do not address service levels so there are two groups 
of load categories in the SRP. 
The first includes normal and severe loads such as dead, live, thermal, 
wind, and loads due to OBE. Several combinations of responses to these 
loads are specified and the combinations must meet either a WSD or LFD 
c> iteria. Factors used in the LFD criteria vary, depending on the loads. 
Examples of the two criteria for the same combination of loads are: 
WSD Criteria D + L + E + T + R „ < 1.35S 
o o -
LFD Criteria .75 (1.4D + 1.7L + 1.9E + 1.7 T Q + 1.7 R Q) < U 
where S is a working stress limit and U is the ultimate strength. D, L, 
E, T and R are stresses induced by dead, live, OBE, normal thermal loads, 
and normal pipe reaction, respectively. 
7 
The load factors applied in the LFD method are individual "safety factors" 
on each response. Ideally, they should consider the probability of occur­
rence of the loads, the probability the loads will be concurrent, and the 
acceptable level of damage. For example, neither a thermal or dynamic 
load should be as damaging as a static load. 
In the WSD method, all responses are given equal weights and response 
sums compared to a stress limit. This is comparable to the ASME approach; 
however, displacement and load-controlled loadings are considered equally 
damaging. 
The second group includes all normal, severe and extreme environmental, 
and abnormal loadings. Several combinations are specified using the 
LFD approach. The factors are lower than those for the normal plus 
severe environmental grouping. This allows some damage, but it should 
be limited so that a safe shutdown can be achieved. 
Development of the load factors for structures has implicitly considered 
the probability of occurrence, dynamic, characteristics of the loadings, 
source of the load (load or displacement controlled), eneryy absorption 
capacity, and service experience of structures. However, no in-depth 
nuclear industry studies have been conducted to evaluate these factors 
using reliability methods. 
Z.3 Rationale for Specifying Load Combinations 
Design by analysis can be achieved economically only by a predominant 
use of liner,- methods at this time. ASME, ACI and AISC codes use this 
philosophy; nonlinearities are only considered implicitly in setting 
acceptance criteria. These design codes are not likely to change signi­
ficantly unless studies provide technical justification, and then will 
change only gradually. Therefore, the methodology developed in this task 
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should meet their requirements, insofar as possible. Some considerations 
in specifying loads, combinations and factors are as follows: 
2.3.1 Loads 
• What are the sources of and uncertainty in the loads? 
• What are the probabilities of occurrence of different load 
intensities? 
• What are the durations of the loads? 
• Is the loading function load or displacement controlled? 
• What are the dynamic characteristics of the loads? 
2.3.2 Load Combinations 
• What is the probability of two or more concurrent loads? 
• What consequences can be allowed due to concurrent loads? 
This determines the equipment service level or structural 
load acceptance criteria. 
• What is the probability that the specified consequences 
(deformation, cracking, etc.) would be exceeded with the 
specified load combination? 
• What is the effect on safety for the specified load combin­
ations (sensitivity of overall risk)? 
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• What response combination criteria is to be associated with 
the selected load combination criteria? 
2.3.3 load Factors 
t What is the nature of the load, i.e., static, vibratory, 
pulsatory, load controlled, displacement controlled? 
• What are the dynamic characteristics of the structure? 
• What factors for combined loads will result in the code 
intended "safety margins"? 
• What effect do the factors have on the probability of failure? 
(sensitivity of risk) 
All these issues must be addressed to develop a rational and uniform basis 
for combining loads. 
2.4 Response Combinations 
The method of combination of multiple dynamic responses should account 
for 1) the probability that the peaks of each response will occur at the 
same time, 2) the consequence of the peak response exceeding a functional 
acceptance criteria, and 3) the consequence of peak responses exceeding a 
strength acceptance criteria. 
Traditionally, responses have been combined by using the absolute sum of 
the peaks. This is always "conservative" and is necessary for static 
loads. However, when responses due to dynamic loads are combined, many 
designers have selected the square-root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares 
(SRSS) method. This is an accepted practice for combining earthquake 
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modal or component responses that recognizes the stochastic nature of 
earthquakes. However, should the SSE occur, there is a significant proba 
hi'lity that the SRSS response would be exceeded. Some probability of 
exceedance is thus acceptable as a response combination criteria; that 
is, absolute sums are not necessarily required. 
Dynamic loads are energy-limited and may be less damaging than static 
loads of the same magnitude. They may be combined in a manner less 
conservative than absolute sum, depending upon their dynamic character­
istics and energy absorption capacity. When computed or a linear basis, 
combined dynamic responses may thus exceed code stress limits without 
decreasing the intended margins. 
In summary, criteria for combining responses to multiple dynamic loads 
must account for the: 
1. Probability that the combined responses will exceed the 
response combination criteria. 
2. Energy content of the dynamic loads. 
3. Relative dynamic characteristics of the ?oad and component. 
4. Functional requirements. 
5. Energy absorption capacity of the component. 
Response and load combination issues are interrelated so that neither 
should be addressed independently in studies on load combination issues. 
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3. REQUIREMENTS FOR A LOAD COMBINATIONS DESIGN CRITERIA/REVIEW 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to describe some requirements on the design 
criteria/review methodology developed in this task. 
It dees not seem practical at this time to require the designer or 
reviewer to use complex methods beyond what is accepted practice. Thus 
we have: 
Requirement 1: The designer or reviewer should only have to combine peak 
responses from individual loads. 
This requirement would exclude from consideration, for example, combining 
stress time histories at various time lags. 
Various metheds of combining the responses could be considered, including 
statistical ones. Again, it is not practical at this time to add any 
more complexity to the design process. Thus we have: 
Requirement 2: 1. response combinations in Requirement 1 should be 
specified in simple ujterministic terms. 
A large body of thought and experience is reflected in existing design codes. 
This professional experience should form a basis for the design criteria 
in this task. Thus we have: 
Requirement 3: For mechanical components the ASME code stress limit and 
service level philosophy should be used. 
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Requirements 1, 2 and 3 together mean the oesigner or reviewer will have 
to check response combination formulas such as ' ' 
Q, • 0 ? + — < R B ) 1 (1.) 
YlQl + V>2 + ™ - Rall ( l b ) 
JM**(yA? + yfr*- ' Ran ( 1 c ) 
G[v,Q r Y 2 Q 2 ] + Y 3 Q 3 + — i R a l l (id) 
where Q,,Q~, ••• are peak responses to loads 1, 2,---, and R ,, is 
some allowable stress. Equation (la) means the p^ak responses are 
combined. Equation (lb) introduces the possibility th?t load factors y. may 
be used. Equations (1c) and (Id) illustrate the possibility that the 
responses may be combined in ways other than absolute sum, e.g., using 
the SRSS Rule, Equation (lc), or other generalized function G(-), Equation 
(Id). 
Thes.. three requirements insure that n n significant additional burden will 
be placed on designers. 
Finally, it is important that the methodology developed be realistic. 
Thus we have: 
Requirement 4: The methodology, when used as an evaluation tool, should 
reflect expected performance and not contain unnecessary or unacceptable 
conservatism. When used for developing design criteria, the methodology 
should accommodate the uncertainties in loads, responses and resistances 
in a realistic way. 
(1) In the sequel, formulas like (lb) will be used for illustrative pur­
poses, but this should not be interpreted to imply the use of formulas 
like (la), (lc), or (Id) is excluded. 
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In summary, the load combination methodology developed in this task is 
to be such uiat 
1. It does not put additional burdens on designers or reviewers. 
2. It fellows the general design format of the ASME Code. 
3. It realistically reflects expected performance and expected 
uncertainties. 
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4. PROPOSED CONCEPT 
A concept has been developed which is being proposed as a solution to 
the problem as described in Section 2 and the requirements as specified 
in Section 3. This concept incorporates a reliability basis along with 
1 the use of load and resistance factors. Aspects of this approach are 
: currently being used with structures and have been incorporated into at 
, least one building code (NBCC-1975). The lethodology from the standpoint 
; of the user is outlined in this section. 
! In the proposed methodology, target reliabilities are provided or estab-
l lished for the systems within the plant based on a specified low risk 
target for the plant. From these system reliabilities, allocations are 
made to establish minimum requirements for component reliabilities. 
These allocations both at the system and component level will reflect 
design redundancies and complexities but can also reflect the relative 
costs to increase reliability. A method for allocating reliability to the 
component level will be developed, or target component reliabilities will 
be provided for certain generic systems. Further discussion of some 
aspects of the system problem are included in Section 8. 
In this approach, one or more acceptable or target reliabilities will be 
defined for each component. These would be defined for various kinds of 
failures or limit states. Examples of limit states for which target reli­
abilities would be specified are: 1) a componer.t can continue to function 
but may have been sufficiently damaged so it must be replaced; 2) a com­
ponent can remain structurally intact but have a load induced failure to 
function; or 3} a component can experience catastrophic failure. 
Once a target limit state probability (complement of target reliability) 
has been specified for a component, the designer or reviewer will be pro­
vided with a table relating load factor values with various probabilities 
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of failure. Implicit in the table will be the instructions of what loads 
need to be combined (the selection of "which loads" will have been accom­
plished along with the optimization of the factors as a result of the 
Load Combinations Program. Of course, the selection of load combinations 
and optimization of load factors depends on many inputs required for the 
optimization process. These inlcude component fragilities and frequencies 
of event such as earthquakes, wind, etc.). A typical table is shown in 
Table 4-1. It should also be noted that along with the specification of 
factors will be the special functional form of the combination equation, 
i.e., Equation lb, lc or Id in Section 3. Stating the factors in tabular 
form enalbes the methodology to accommodate different target component 
limit state probabilities for different systems of different plants by 
simply adjusting the load factors for concurrent loads. 
The approach which will be used to develop the 'optimal' design format, 
load combinations and load factors is discussed in Section 6. 
Table 4-1. Example of Format of Results of Load Combination Methodology 
For "Loss of Function" Limit State 
PROBABILITY OF 
LOSS OF FUNCTION 
LOAD FACTORS FOR DESIGN LOADS*** 







1.0 0.6 0 0.4 0 
0.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.8 
1.5 1.8 1.7 1.8 0 
1.6 2.0 0 2.5 0 
1.4 1„7 1.9 1.7 1.7 
*See Section 2-2 for the definitions of 
the loads used in the table 
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5. RELATED APPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The reliability approach we describe in this report has been used since 
1964 to develop design code rules, load factors, and load combination 
formulas for' the design of ordinary building structures. 
5.1 Historical Background of Comparable Structural Reliability 
Methods 
It was recognized in the early 50's mainly through the pioneering efforts 
of Freudenthal (1974) that the uncertainties in the design process can 
only be consistently treated by probabilistic models. Later research in 
the area of structural reliability indicated that design by reliability 
analysis is iterative and not suited for routine design. Several decisions 
may have to be made by the designer for which adequate data may not exist. 
Such judgmental decisions regarding acceptable failure probability, 
consequence of failure, and relevance or absence of data are best done by 
the code. Hence, the need for deterministic formats for probabilistic 
design of structures became clear (Lind - 1968). The tools that are 
available for developing such deterministic codes for probabilistic 
design are code calibration and code optimization (Ravindra and Lind -
1973). 
In recent years, design codes for probabilistic design of steel, concrete 
and wood structures have been developed. Further details can be found 
in Appendix B. 
The point we want to emphasize here is that the concepts of reliability 
analysis, deterministic format for probabilistic design and code optimiza­
tion are not new and have been successfully employed in related areas of 
structural engineering to develop practical design rules. 
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5.2 Special Considerations in Applying Reliability Methods in 
Nuclear Design 
Design rules developed for ordinary buildings are not directly applicable 
to the design of nuclear power plants. Several unique aspects of nuclear 
power plants contribute to tins observation. The objective of the 
following discussion is to highlight the differences between ordinary 
buildings and nuclear power plants that substantiate the need for the 
proposed study of load combinatin:-is. 
1. In the probabilistic code development for ordinary 
buildings based on second moment methods, safety 
index (see Appendix B) is used as a relative measure of 
reliability. This measure may be too crude for nuclear 
design, hence, it is more appropriate to use the 
probability of the component reaching some limit state 
as the central parameter in probabilistic design method­
ology for nuclear power plants. Also, development of 
design criteria based on component limit state probability 
is consistent with the refinement expected in a probabil­
istic system safety analysis. Therefore, the second 
moment methods will not be used; instead fully probabil­
istic methods will be employed. 
2. Failure of an ordinary structure does not have the same 
consequences as the failure of a nuclear power plant. 
Because of this, the reliability level desired of a 
nuclear power plant is much higher than the level 
desired of an ordinary structure. The safety index method 
used to derive the partial safety factors for the design 
of ordinary structures is too simplified and therefore 
will not give consistent results. 
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Code development for the design of ordinary structures 
has been carried out by calibrating to the reliabilities 
implied in current designs. This circumvents the need 
to specify acceptable limit state probabilities and 
demonstrate by calculation or test that the code pro­
visions achieve the intended target. The philosophy 
bellind the calibration is that the experience with 
ordinary Structures is sufficiently broad and over a 
long period of time, so that the safety inherent to 
these structures is acceptable. On the other hand, the 
experience with nuclear power plants is limited to a 
few plants and over a short time span. In addition, the 
existing design rules may be too conservative. Calibra­
tion to existing design rules is thus not very meaningful 
for nuclear power plants. This is because our experience 
with the results of these design rules (nuclear power 
plants) is limited, so limited that the absence of 
failures should not be interpreted as success considering 
the extreme loads the design should survive, and the 
general absence of repeated applications of such extreme 
loads. This means design codes for nuclear power plants 
have not been validated by the traditional method used 
in engineering and that calibration is not generally 
applicable. 
Because a large number of ordinary structures are designed 
using a design code, it is possible to monitor the per­
formance of a code over a relatively short period of time. 
If a code leads to an unacceptably high (or low) probability 
of failure of structures as observed by the failure rates, 
partial safety factors in the code can be adjusted to 
yield the desired levels. Such a validation or adjustment 
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based on the monitoring of the code performance is not 
feasible for nuclear design codes. This calls for a 
detailed study of the lead combinations founded on compon­
ent and system reliability analyses. 
5. The design loads acting on ordinary structures have 
moderately hijh probabilities of occurrence (e.g., 100 
year wind speed and 500 year earthquake). In the 
context of nuclear plant design, these can be categorized 
into normal or operating loads. In addition, nuclear 
power plants are designed to withstand extreme and 
transient loads with much ''ower probabilities of 
occurrence than ordinary structures. Partial safety 
factors on these extreme loads need to be derived. 
6. Nuclear power plants are to be designed to withstand a 
large number of loads from a variety of sources. Since 
the ordinary structures are not designed against these 
loads, partial safety factors on these loads are not 
available. 
7. Major loads in nuclear power plants are dynamic; partial 
safety factors considering component response to such 
dynamic leads need to h- developed. 
8. Nuclear components/systems ate expected to perform under 
extreme environmental (pressure, temperature, radiation 
and humidity) conditions. The partial safety factors 
should reflect this requirement. 
9. Probabilistic design criteria for ordinary structural 
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elements exist; ccrresponding cr i ter ia for piping and 
equipment have not been developed. 
10. Nuclear plant design anrf construction is done to 
e x a r * " : " j n f l / r i r " >'rqu ; '""tn'-"it'', '".v " f p e d i n ' i n n ••• 
design and construction. Any development of design 
criteria should take this into account. 
These unique aspects of nuclear design and the extreme loads considered 
in this design clearly call for an extensive investigation of tr » load 
combination problem specific to nuclear design. 
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6. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA BASED ON COMPONENT 
RELIABILITY 
This section provides a general description of a method to develop 
design criteria for nuclear components subject to multiple loads based 
on the component reliability approach. The criteria will be expressed 
as a series of equations in a load and resistance factor design format 
as given by the general formula: 
J 
j=i 
where R - nominal resistance of the component 
$ - resistance (performance) factor 
Q. - load effect (peak response) for the jth nominal load 
V* - load factor for the jth load 
The resistance and load factors reflect the uncertainties in the resistance, 
loads and responses used ^n the design. This format allows a significant 
flexibility compared to ,.;,• i others, for example, stress limit formats 
where all YJ = 1-
As discussed in Appendix B, the resistance factor, <J , is used to reflect 
uncerta, ty in the strength, and is always less than unity. This will 
depend on the material (steel, concrete, etc.) and limit state under 
consideration (functionality, collapse, etc.). The (L reflects the 
response due to the jth nominal load under consideration at the point 
where the formula is being checked by the designer. 
For example, Q. may represent the peak response due to the OBE, and YJ 
is the corresponding load factor which reflects the uncertainties associated 
with responses due to the OBE. Other formulas and Y's may be used for 
other loads, e.g., the SSE. For a given component, a number of formulas 
like (2) may have to be checked by the designer. 
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A number of different formats are possible. For example, it may be possible 
to adopt a format based on considering only the responses due to two loads 
at a time, that is, J=2 in (2). Alternative formats of this type will be 
evaluated both with respect to any technical limitations or advantages and 
the implications in design. For variour reasons, for example, ease of 
checking or quality assurance, it may be desirable to have a number of 
equations, but combining the responses from only two loads in each. Other 
possibilities arise also. For example, there may be good reasons to have 
each load described by two or more nominal sizes as has been done for 
the earthquakes. 
The method has as its goal the determination of an "optimal" set of 
design ru'es for a given target limit siate probability, P. . These 
rules include the determination of which responses need to be combined 
(which y. in (2) are not zero) and the values of the load factors. The 
derived resistance and load factors will depend on the target limit state 
probability, the characteristics of the loads and the responses to be 
combined, as well as the component. 
The proposed methodology involves two steps—a "design" step followed 
by an evaluation step. For a given design fcrmat (i.e., load combination, 
method of analysis, and calculation procedure for component resistance) 
these two steps are iterated to derive the "optimal" design rules (i.e., 
resistance and load factors). Optimization is determined with respect 
tc an appropriate measure of closeness of the evaluated component limit 
state probability, P., based on a given set of design rules, to the target 
component limit state probability, P f . The measure of closeness is eval­
uated over the space (denoted the data space) of all possible design sit­
uations (e.g. reactor type, component type, geographic location and mag­
nitudes cf different load effects). 
The data space is considered to assure that the resistance and load factors 
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derived using this methodology is applicable for a large spectrum of 
design situations. A schematic description of the methodology is given 
in Figure 6.1. Notationally, 
<J> = resistance factors 
y = load factors 
y = data point in the data space, V 
f(y) = frequency of occurrence of y e P 
W(.,.) = measure of closeness, e.g. W(a,b) = (a-b) 
!i 
SELECT: DESIGN FORMAT \+-
5ELECT: RESISTANCE 
AND LOAD FACTORS, 
SELELT: DATA POINT, u>£> 
+ 
DESIGN: OETERMJNE 





/ L A S T \ H 0 
nu i) = £ f(u)H(pf[u] , p f 0) 
I 
S / M N a(«.5lNS. OPTIMAL 4.1 FOR GIVEN 
DESIGN FORMAT, 
Figure 6-1. Block Diagram of Proposed Method 
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Given a design format, and an initial set of resistance and load factors, 
the "design" step involves the determination of the component resistance 
parameter, R, at each data point u and corresponding set of deterministic 
influence coefficients, C(w), based on the set of design equations 
J 
* R J I - £ c « < (-u ) \ j L j * = ' ' 2 t •••l { 3 ) 
where L. - nominal load intensities due to the jth load 
C 0.(UJ) - influence coefficients which transfonn the load 
intensities into load effects 
L - number of load combination equations appropriate 
for the component design 
v.. - load factor for the jth response in the 4th load 
combination equation 
The design resistance, R, is 
R = max R„ 
which is a function of the design format, the resistance and load effects, 
the data point, UJ , and the corresponding set of influence coefficients, 
£ (u). It should be emphasized that "design" used in the present context 
is a much simpler process of proportioning and does not cover planning 
and detailing. 
Having computed the design resistance, the component reliability is 
assessed in the evaluation step. In this step the component limit state 
probability, P-, is calculated ba ed on an "ideal" model given the compon­
ent resistance R from the design step. The method of evaluation, based on 
the probabilistic data of the loads, the combined responses and the compon­
ent resistance is described in Appendix A. The output- of the evaluation 
step is the component limit state probability, P f(w). 
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These two steps are iterated over the appropriate data space, D, and the 
corresponding set of influence coefficients £(y), thus resulting in a 
collection of values of P ^ u ) . These values, in turn, are compared with 
the target liwit state probability, P f o , and the differences are summed 
over the data space, D. Thus, for a given design format and set of 
resistance and 10c,d factors., (<ji, y)> the objective function a[$>y) given 
by 
a<*' v) = £ f(<?) u tpf(«)» p f 0 ] w 
wee 
where W(>) is an appropriate distance measure, e.g. W(a,b)=(a-b) and 
f(«>) is a weight or frequency measure associated with the point yeD 
This general two-step procedure is iterated for different resistance and 
load factors to determine the "optimal" set of design rules. The term 
optimal refers to the set of design rules which minimize fi($,y) for the 
given design format. Finally, the proposed method can also be used to 
compare alternative design fonnats. For example, alternative formats could 
be SRSS vs. Absolute Sum, LOCA + SSE combination vs no such combination. 
One basis of such comparisons could be the initial cost. 
The "two-step" code optimization process can be used in a variety of ways. 
First, one process would leave out the design iteration in the two-step 
process. For example, the design of a particular nuclear power plant 
could be accepted as given. The evaluation step could be applied using 
the "ideal" model. This evaluation process could be used for at least 
two purposes: 
1. Estimate the limit state probability of the various 
components in the plant. Thus, if this probability varies 
significantly, some affected components with high pro­
bability may be reinforced to improve overall plant safety. 
This provides a convenient safety checking tool for the 
regulatory agency. 
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2. Whenever new loads, load combinations and procedures for 
combining responses are postulated, their effect on the 
component limit state probabilities can be estimated. If 
the effect is unacceptable, design criteria can be modified 
using the two step process. 
Second, the two-step process can be used for a given set of components 
in various ways: 
1. A matrix of component limit state probabilities and 
optimized code rules (coincident loads, load factors, 
etc.) could be developed. Such a matrix would no doubt 
show, as the target limit state probability decreased, 
the requirement to consider more and more various loads 
in various combinations in even more complex code rules. 
2. A matrix of component limit state probabilities and 
optimized code rules for the same component in different 
locations in the plant could be developed. 
In summary, the primary advantage of this methodology is that it does not 
require any new load combinations nor any documented justification for the 
load combinations. Since the load and resistance factors are adjusted to 
achieve the target component limit state probability, the questions of 
the fact that some combinations govern the design, and of the need for 
some combinations are moot. 
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7. SYSTEM RELIABILITY MODEL 
7,1 Introduction 
The safety analysis of a r\uc]ear power plant uses the reliability of 
the components, subsystems, and systems in the plant to establish the 
reliability of the plant. In determining expected consequences from 
failures in the plant, the complements of these reliabilities (the 
limit state probabilities) are used in fault and event trees and are 
combined with release categories and release consequences to produce 
the plant risk. A typical presentation of this risk is in the form of 
a "Farmer curve", (Farmer - 1967) which plots probability as a function 
of the number of casulaties. 
This analysis moves from component reliability to plant risk. However, 
in order to establish load combination requirements in the most general 
sense, we must establish a required "*• target component reliability. 
Thus, the process must be reversed and we must proceed from a Farmer 
curve or some other statement of plant reliability backward to establish 
the required component reliability. Moreover, it must be implied that 
the selected curve represents an acceptable level of risk before 
component reliabilities can be inferred to be acceptable. 
Even if no precise acceptable risk can be specified, a load combination 
methodology such as we outline here will still lead to the development 
of more rational and systematic design (load combination) requirements*. 
It will also provide guidance towards a more effective and balanced 
* Interestingly, just such a process is presently being used by the 
Central Electricity Generating Board to determine load combination 
requirements for new plants in the United Kingdom. 
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allocation of resources (steel, concrete, etc.) to the protection of the 
health and safety of the public, by providing a means to focus on the 
more important safety issues. 
7.2 Establishment of a Risk Reference at the System Level 
In the past, the term "acceptable risk" has created controversy because 
it is largely subjective. Acceptable risk can be presented on an absolute 
basis such as in a Farmer curve whose level of probability versus conse­
quence is deemed acceptable by some responsible organization or government 
body. Thus, a system whose safety evaluation produces a curve which never 
exceeds the acceptable risk curve would be found to have an acceptable 
risk. 
In the absence of a sanctioned risk, system analysts frequently use 
relative risk to show that the system under evaluation has no greater 
risk than other systems whose risk is found acceptable either officially 
or in a de facto sense. 
There can also be consideration of incremental risk where one examines 
the increase in risk due to the addition or modification of a particular 
system, [ncremental risk could be considered in the load combinations 
problem by determining the additional risk to which the power plant is 
exposed when certain load combinations are not considered in the design 
criteria of the plant. This incremental risk however, falls back upon the 
need for some acceptable risk level. It could be that the incremental 
risk added to the previous risk still does not exceed a so-called 
acceptable risk level. Thus, no matter what one calls the risk evaluation, 
there is a need to seek a reference level upon which to base the resulting 
requirements for system and component limit state probabilities. 
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If obtaining consensus on a reference risk level proves difficult, 
additional studies of the impact of various risk levels may be necessary. 
For example, studies could be made on the economic impact of various 
acceptable risk requirements. In this instance, acceptable risk would 
be used as a parameter in quantitative studies (using current models) 
to determine cost as a function of the various acceptable risk levels 
considered. 
Another approach to the use of acceptable risk could be based on conditional 
events. For example, it could be assumed that the SSE or LOCA or other 
significant events occur with a probability of one. The acceptable risk 
could be stated in terms of the conditional probability that the system 
will fail given the event. Conceivably, lower values (more like 1 x 10" 
-5 or 1 x 10 ) could be considered for individual conditional probabilities 
considering the fact that the probabilities of the initiating events are 
generally much less than one. 
7.3 Establishment of Individual Safety System Reliability 
Requirements 
As mentioned in the introduction, the process of obtaining the required 
limit state probability levels for the components is an inverse process 
from the normal system safety analysis. In this discussion, it has been 
divided into two steps; component and plant reliabilities. A problem 
that arises in this inverse analysis is that the specified values, i.e., 
the acceptable reference or ideal risk levels, are few, while the values 
to be established are many since they involve all of the limit state 
probabilities of the components under consideration in the plant. Thus, 
the problem is one of an underdetermined set of equations which does not 
establish unique values for the limit state probabilities at either 
the component or the system 1 eve!. 
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What is suggested in this discussion is a staging of the limit state 
probability requirements and, perhaps, an allocation of limit state 
probability among systems and components based on specific criteria. 
These criteria could include: 
1. Assigning the same limit state probability requirement 
(i.e., P, level) to each safety system. 
2. Allowing the owner/engineer to allocate the P,'s among 
each of the safety systems, giving consideration to cost 
trade-offs. The allocation would be acceptable as long 
as, in combination, the safety systems provided the 
required plant reliability. 
3. Establishing classes or categories for the various safety 
systems and allocating limit s*ate probabilities according 
to the classes. These classes could be arranged according 
to the severity of the consequences associated with the 
failures of those particular systems. 
The discussion above reinforces the fact that system safety analyses will 
be needed in the design or modification phase of the nuclear power plant. 
It also points out the dependency of the specification of the system's 
reliabilities on the acceptable risk level and the need for a general 
study to evaluate alternative methods for selecting acceptable failure 
probabilities for safety systems. 
7A Determination of Target Component Limit State Probability 
When a component is one of many within a safety system and the safety 
system aspires to a single limit state probability, we are once again 
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faced with the problem of underdetermined equations. Therefore, the options 
available in the development of the load combination methodology are: 
1. Requiring the same limit state probability level in all 
components in the safety system; 
2. Establishment of classes of components such that each 
component in a class has the same limit state probability; 
3. Allocation of F, among the components such that the 
safety system limit state probability requirement is 
still satisfied. 
If components are treated by classification, for instance, all 
piping involved in particular systems in the power plant could have 
the same P f requirement; this might simplify the P f selection by the 
designer. Trade-offs between components would allow the owner/engineer 
to minimize cost while still achieving the safety goal for the system 
of which the components are a part. Choosing the same limit state prob­
ability for all would probably not be wise because of the relative expense 
in hardening certain components. 
Again, it will be necessary to perform studies evaluating the various 
alternatives for selecting target P f for the various components. It should 
be noted that any time components are grouped by class or system and every 
component in the class is given the same target P,, this P f will have to 
be lower than that which would be allowed in an optimum allocation. This 
is because using the classification approach allows flexibility in the use of 
the components and in the definition of the system. Thus, if a P.c is estab­
lished for these components by class, no combination of the components 
should produce a system probability of failure exceeding the specified 
level of acceptability. 
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8. VALIDATION 
The methods described in this report ?re largely analytic and consequently 
the design rule could initially be based totally on models with limited 
data. The problem then is to establish the validity of the models and 
the resulting design rules to provide justification to the profession 
for their adoption. 
It appears that conclusive testing to validate the methodology will be 
very expensive and time consuming, and at this stage it is not possible 
to structure a definitive test program. Thus, in the meantime, validation 
will be dependent upon alternatives such as: 
1. Extensive peer review of methods and models. 
2. Comparison of resulting designs with those from current 
codes to indicate whether current deficiencies have been 
removed and whether the new designs show more balance. 
3. Calibration wif 1 >serit standards where possible. 




COMPONENT LIMIT STATE PROBABILITY EVALUATION 
As part of the methodology for the derivation of optimal design rules 
based on a target limit state probability, P., the component limit state 
probability, P f, must be evaluated. The procedure for evaluating P, must 
toke into consideration the load combinations considered in the design 
as well as any loads initiated as a consequence of initial loads. The 
proposed method of analysis is based on using the expected upcrossing 
rate v +(' 1), as a function of stress, r, and the arbitrary point-in-time 
distribution of stress, as described by the probability density function, 
f. (r), for assessing the combined effects of the loading processes. 
The proposed approach for calculating P, is outlined below. Details of 
the methods used in the analysis follow. 
To compute the component limit state probability, the occurrence of differ­
ent initial load combinations as well as any subsequent additional loads 
must be taken into consideration. Let q, q=l, ...,Q, index the different 
load cases, i.e., the occurrence of one or more initial loads e.g. wind 
plus earthquake, and any subsequent or initiated load, e.g., pipe break. 
Also, let P(q) denote the probability of occurrence of the qth case. 
Assuming the different load casps are mutually exclusive, P f can be 
written as the sum 
P f = Z ^ P ( q ) P(f|q) (Al) 
where P(f|q) denotes the component limit state probability given load 
case q. 
The component limit state is modeled as the limit state being attained 
at any one of the k "critical" points (or cross bt^tions) in the compon­
ent. Then, 
P(f|q) = P[F(q,l) U F(q,2) U . . - uF(q.K)] (A2) 
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where F(q,k) denotes the event that the limit state occurs at point k 
under load case q. An appropriate estimate of P(f|q), considering the 
stochastic dependence between the different points in the component, is 
P(f|q) = max P{T(q,k)] (A3) 
k 
given load case q, let Z, denote the stress induced at point k under K ,q 
To determine the limit state probability at point (cross section) k 
1 
load case q. Then, 
CO 
P[F(q,k)] = f P [Z. >r] f R (r)dr (A4) 
r=0 K , q Kk 
where f R {•) is the probability density function of the resistance, 
R. , at tne point (cross-section) k and P [I. >r] is the probability 
that the stress induced under load case q exceeds r. 
The distribution of the resistance, f 0 (•), is a function of the component 
Kk 
design and will depend on the limit state. It is an input into the eval­
uation procedure. The probabilities, P[Z. >r], are a function of 
\> (r) and f.{r). To evaluate these probabilities, potential loads on a 
component are partitioned into two classes: 
a. Ini tial loads 
Loads which have a potential of initiating additional loads 
on the component due to failures of other parts of a system. 
This class of loads includes loads due to earthquake, wind, 
hurricane, normal operation and operating incidents, etc. 
Some examples of the time histories of responses to 
initial loads are given in Figure A-l. 
1 The probability, P(q), is determined from the rates of occurrence of 










Figure A-l. Examples of Time Histories of Responses to Initial Loads. 
Initiated Loads 
Loads on a component due to the response and/or failure 
of another part of a system as a consequence of some 
initial load. Loads in this class arise from pipe breaks, 
valves failing to close, turbine trip, etc. An example 
of the relationship between the time history of the response 
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to an initial load, e.g., due to an earthquake, and the 
response to an initiated load, e.g., a pipe break, is 
given in Figure A-2. 
Responses to initial loads are assumed to be either continuous (e.g., normal 
operation) or intermittently continuous (e.g., the earthquake, windstorm 
and operating Incident) processes. A stationary continuous process can 
be described by the expected upcrossing rate v (r) and the arbitrary point 
in time probability density function, f. (<•), both a function of stress, 
r. The expected upcrossing rate, v (r), is the expected number of crossings, 
per unit time, of the response process from a stress level less than r to 
a stress level greater than r. For a response process, L(t), let 




G L(r,T) = P[L(0)> r] + P[L(0) <r] S P [Exactly j upcrossings) 
of L(t) at level r occur in (0 J ) | L(0)< r] 
But, assuming a stationary process, 
Vr(r)T = E[Number of upcrossings of L(t) at level (A6) 
r in (0,T)] 
= £ J p [ Exactly j upcrossings at level 
0=1 
r occur in (0 ,T ) ] 
Then, 





/̂ L- PIPE BREAK LOAD (INITIATED) 
TIME LAG 
Figure A-2. Relationship Between the Response to an Initial Load and 
the Response to an Initiated Load. 
38 
Thus, v. (r)T provides an upper bound and also a close approximation to 
the probability of the max L(t) exceeding r. 
(Kt<T 
An intermittent continuous process, L(t), can be viewed as a product 
X(t)Y(t) of a continuous process X(t) and a (0,1) rectangular renewal 
pulse process Y(t) with expected renewal rate, X, and expected duration 
u D (i.e., the expected length of time Y(t) = 1 given an event occurs—Y(t) 
changes from 0 to 1). These latter two parameters are associated with the 
distributions of the random variables D and I illustrated in Figure A-3. 
ftki, A. 
H 
Figure A-3. Intermittent Continuous Process 
The variable D denotes the duration of the response (e.g., response to the 
load due to a windstorm) and I denotes the interarrival (renewal) times 
between events (e.g., occurrence of a windstorm). The expected value of 
D is p n and the expected interarrival time, p., is 1/A . 
If v x(r) is the expected upcrossing rate for the continuous process X(t), 
the expected upcrossing rate, \>|(r), for the intermittent continuous process, 
L(t), is given by 
v L(r) = qv x(r) (A8) 
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where q is the ratio of the expected duration of a response, P D , to the 
expected interarrival time, p., or q = \\iQ. 
The arbitrary point in time probability density function describes the 
distribution of stress levels of a response process viewed at an 
arbitrary point in the process. For an intermittent continuous process, 
L(t). 
f L(r) = p«(r) + (1-p) f x(r) (A9) 
where 
j 1 if r = 0 
[0 otherwise, 
and p is the probability the process is at zero, i.e., an event is not 
occurring, and fy(r) is the arbitrary point in time probability density 
function for the continuous process X(t). 
For purposes of the computation of the actual component limit state 
probability, P_, the response to each initial load is assumed to be 
T i 
described by four parameters, *,V|_(r), f L(r), f D(d) or u n , where f D(d) 
is the density function for the random duration D. 
Similarly, the responses to initiated loads are assumed to be described 
by three parameters, v L(r), f. (r), f T(t) oru-p where f T(t) is the 
probability density function for the delay between the response to the 
occurrence of an initial Toad and the beginning of the response to the 
initialized load and \ij is the expected delay. 
To illustrate the determination of v (r) and f(r) for a combination 
of loads, consider the scenario of a windstorm followed by the occurrence 
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of an earthquake. The concurrent responses are shown in Figure A-4 
LU O 
Z3 
1 L_ ' l'_J 
I-—WINDSTORM——I - H EARTHQUAKE 
Figure A-4 Concurrent Responses Due to a windstorm and an Earthquake 
Let (vu »fy) and (v £ ,fp) be the expected upcrossing rate and arbitrary 
point in time probability density function for the continuous response 
processes associated with the windstorm and earthquake respectively. Then, 
conditional on concurrent responses, the expected upcrossing rate for the 
responses to the intermittent windstorm and earthquake processes are 
respectively 
V» = l'w vW + l r ) (A10> 
and 
where 
V"(r) = q' Ev E +(r) 
q'„ - u w/(y E + py) 
q'E = v E/(u E + u M) 
(All) 
Then, the upcrossing rate for the combined response is approximated by 
the convolution of the upcrossing rate of each process with the arbitrary 
point in time distribution of the other. That is. 
v IKE (r) • / v w




where f., and f_ are the appropriately transformed functions as given 
by Equation (A9). Similarly, 
W ( r * ' J V r " x ) V x ) d x (A13> 
x 
In the case of the response to an initial load combined with the response 
to an initiated load, (\>+,f), the response to the initiated load will 
have to be transformed to accoramodate the lag time prior to taking the 
convolution. 
The initial step in the determination of P(q) and P[2. >r] is to identify 
K ,q 
all possible load combinations which lead to potential failure at the 
kth point. The analyses will involve the construction of a load event 
tree as illustrated in Figure A-5. 
The expected frequency of occurrence of case q is denoted A . For example, 
for the combination, windstorm + earthquake + pipebreak, 
Aq = A W • *DW*E ' pCPBj E,W> (A14) 
where 
Xp,X w - expected frequency of an earthquake, 
windstorm respectively 
u D W - expected duration of response to a windstorm load 
P(PB| E,W) - conditional probability of a pipe break given an 
earthquake plus wind. 
The probability of occurrence of load case q during the life, L, of 
the component is: 






LOAD (NON INITIATED 
RANDOM) 
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INITIATED LOAD P ( q ) " X q L 
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Figure A-5. Load Event Tree for Any Time Increment^ 
For load case q the expected upcrossing rate 0 (r) and arbitrary point 
in time probability density function fQ(»") are evaluated as described 
previously. If Z, „ denotes the maximum stress at point k due to 
load case q, i.e. 
K'M 0<t<T K'C1 
where S k (t) denotes the concurrent response process for case q at 
point k, then 
P [ Z k i q £ r] 2 exp [-vJ(r)L] (A17) 
Thus, based on life, L, an approximation to the probability of the 
peak stress at point k exceeding r is 
P [ Z k > q >r] - G q +(r)L (A18) 
Equations (A4) and (Al) are used to evaluate the component limit state 
probability. 
The attractiveness of using the expected upcrossing rate and arbitrary 
point in time probability density function is that both functions can 
be estimated from response spectra data associated with the analysis of 
initial and initiated loads. 
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APPENDIX B 
DETAILED EXPOSITION OF RELATED APPLICATIONS 
This appendix describes recent research and code development activities 
pertaining to the probabilistic analysis and design of structures. The 
discussion herein highlights the following topics: need for probabilistic 
design, second moment design formats, calibration, Load and Resistance 
Factor Design (LRFD), load combination studies, levels of probabilistic 
design codes and code optimization. 
B.l Need for Probabilistic Design 
The sophistication achieved in analyzing structures using 
computers has not been matched by the procedures of selecting the 
design loads and allowable stresses or load factors. The level 
of structural safety is only implied in these selection procedures. 
Freudenthal (1947) showed that the use of safety factors may not 
lead to consistent levels of safety in all design situations. 
Uncertainties present in the design and construction processes 
because of random loads, variability in material strengths and the 
imperfect modeling of structures for analysis and design should 
be considered in the selection of safety factors. Freudenthal 
(1947) argued that since the probability of failure is the o-?ly 
rational measure of structural safety, any criteria used in 
design should result in consistent failure probabilities for 
different design situations. The probability of failure, P~, is 
the probability that the load effect, Q, on a structure exceeds 
the resistance, R. Both the load effect and the resistance 
(measured in the same units) are random variables; probability 
density functions for Q and R are denoted fp(q) and f R(r) 
respectively. Referring to Fig. B-l, failure occurs when Q is 
larger than R; the region R < Q is the failure region. Thus, 
the probability of failure is evaluated as: 
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•tt'/tt'' 
LOAD EFFECT Q 
CJO 
P f = P[R<Q] = f [l-Fq<r)]fR(r)dr 
Figure B-l. Fundamental Case 
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OO CO 
P f = P[R<Q] = / / f Q ( q ) d q f R(r) dr 
= A l - F q(r)] fR(r)dr (Bl) 
where F.(q) is the cumulative distribution function of Q. The 
above equations assume that R and Q are stochastically independent. 
The probability of failure is highly sensitive to the distribution 
assumptions. Figure B-2 shows the failure probability as a function 
of the central safety factor (e=<aR/nQ) for several families of 
probability distributions (Rosenblueth and Esteva - 1971). The 
above equation for failure probability is applicable for a struc­
tural member under a single applied load. A structural system 
generally consists of many members and is subjected to a number of 
loads. Models for system reliability analyses that are tradition­
ally used are series systems ("weakest link" model), parallel 
systems, combined systems and conditional systems (Benjamin, J969). 
Evaluation of the probability of failure of a structural system 
should take into account the spatial and temporal correlations 
between the applied loads and between member resistances. Since 
the resulting multiple integrals are difficult to evaluate and the 
information on correlations is generally lacking, bounds on the 
system failure probability have been developed (Cornell, 1967; 
Moses and Kinser, 1967; Vanmarke, 1972). 
In order to design a structure using structural reliability analysis, 
the acceptable probability of failure of the system ?hould be 
specified. This is a controversial topic in the building desion. 
The individual designer is not permitted to select the failure 
probability; the code writers currently make this choice only in 
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Figure B-2. Failure PrcbrMiities for Several Families 
of Jistributions 
48 
failure probability for the structural system will not help in 
obtaining a unique design, because many designs/structural con­
figurations could have the same system failure probability. Since 
the primary objective of structural engineering is to produre 
r:,?siqns, as opposed to analysis of the structural reliability, a 
need existed for probabilistic structural design criteria that 
incorporates the essential features of probabilistic safety analy­
sis and is practical for routine design office use. Therefore, 
research since 1966 has focused on the development of probabilistic 
design codes. 
B.Z Second Moment Design Formats 
The first practical probabilistic design code format was proposed 
by Cornell (1969). The essential features of this format 6r- that 
the random variables of interest to structural safety are modeled 
by the first two statistical moments, viz, mean and variance. 
The mean of a randc-m variable indicates the central tendency of the 
variable and the variance reflects the dispersion about the mean. 
In this format, structural safety is characterized by a relative 
measure of reliability known as "safety index", 3. The safety 
index is defined as the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation 
of safety margin; safety margin is the value of the resistance 
of the member minus the load effect acting or, it. Referring to 
Figure B-3, safety index is expressed as the distance between the mean 
of safety margin and the point of failure (i.e., when the safety 
margin equals zero) in terms of the standard deviation of safety 
margin. Thus. 
6 = Safety Index = -2-^- (B?) 
7R-Q 
If both R and Q have Gaussian distributions the probability of 







B = SAFETY INDEX JR-Q 
Figure B-3, Cornell Model 
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where * is the standard normal integral. If no distribution 
assumptions are made, we can only say that a higher value of B 
indicates higher reliability. Two designs are considered consis­
tent if they have the same reliability. Such consistency can be 
judged approximately by evaluating the safety indices of the 
designs. 
The safety index concept can be extended to design situations 
where a large number of variables such as loads, material pro­
perties, geometrical dimensions and factors representing the 
modeling uncertainties are to be considered. The failure criterion 
can be written as 
g(x r x2..., x n) = z = o {B3) 
The random variables X. are described by their mean, m^, and 
standard deviation, a . A value of Z less than zero corresponds 
to failure. Linearization of Eq. B3 using a Taylor series 
expansion gives the approximation, n 
g(x 1*,x z*,...,x n*) + J]|j[.(x rxJ) = Z = 0 <B4) 
i=l 1 
The ^oint (x*,xi, . . ,x*) about which the expansion is carried 
out, is suggested by Cornell (1969) to be the mean (m„ ,m.. , . . 
m v ). The mean and standard deviation of Z are estimated as *n 
m7 ~ g{m ,m , . . . , m ) (B5) 
L X 1 Xg X n 
and 
•« = "Esf °dyz < K > , . , » « , • • , 
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The derivatives in Eq. B6 are evaluated at (mv , . . .,mv ). A *1 An design is considered to have a reliability represented by the 
safety index B if 
m Z Bo z > 0 (B7) 
For routine design purposesi i t is necessary to specify a set 
of partial safety factors (Ravindra, Heaney and Lind - 1969). 
This can be done by writ ing 
ffz= £> *V*1 (B8) 
where n 
ai =SL \ l h (ft a*f ]"1/2 < B 9 > 
I f g(.) is linear in X-, Eq. B7 can be rewritten as: 
1=1 * i=i i i 
n 
or, 2 J | a (m -Ban. ax.) > 0 (Bll) 
i=l 3 x i x i i i -
The derivatives are -1 or +1 in this linear case. The partial 
safety factors to be applied to m., are y. = 1 -8c*,. Vw. 
where V v is the coefficient of variation of the random variable 
«,• 
For the design problem with two variables, e.g. , load effect Q 
and resistance R, the design cr i ter ion becomes 
mR{l - ctR 6VR) > mQ(l + ctq pVR) (B12) 
The second moment design format achieves most of the stated 
objectives of probabilistic design: simplicity, consistency and 
rational (but approximate) description of the uncertainties. 
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However, the probability information contained in the safety 
index 0 is poor. The linear approximation of the g-function 
at the mean of the design variables may be too inaccurate since 
most design situations exhibit severe nonlinearities. Also, 
this design format (Eqs. B5 and B6) fails to be invariant with the 
mechanical formulation of the problem; the safety index B 
depends on this formulation and on the number of variables used in 
the analysis. Recently proposed second moment formats (Ditlevsen, 
1973; Hasofer and Lind, 1974; Veneziano, 1974; Paloheimo, 1973; 
Lind, 1974; Rackwitz, 1976) overcome these problems. The procedure 
developed by Rackwitz (1976) follows: 
Let g (X,, X 2, - - - -, X ) be the mechanical formulation function 
of the reliability problem under study, where X,, Xp, — • X 
are the basic variables. Failure occurs if and only if g < 0. 
The safety of the member can be assessed, called "safety checking", 
by measuring the random distance from the mean to any point in 
the sample space of the structural variables on the surface 
representing the failure criterion. This point is denoted 
{ x*,xi,.,,,x* } . The safety index is defined as 6 = m_ /a 
i £ n =0 *o 
rfhere g is the linear approximation to g(.) = 0 
g0 - gCW. "..O+E!f>i-xi>i0 (B,3) i=i 
in which all the derivatives are evaluated at the point (x|,—-x*). 
Then, in 
g0 , i " .-i v"i "i 
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By the definit ion of the safety index, 
tn - $cr = 0 (B17) 
Mo Mo 
Substituting Eqs. (B15), <B16) in Eq„ (G17), we obtain 
g(x1*, x 2*, • • • ' x n ) + £ ; i i < ' n x i - X1 - a^ Sa x ) = 0 (B18) 
The first term is zero; the second term becomes zero if 
x, = mx_ - a., 3a1. (B19) 
An iterative procedure is used to obtain the design point 
{*f»*2 x n > • 
if "k it 
g(x1 , x ? , .... x n ) = g( .... m x. - a.B a x ) = 0 (B20) 
is solved together with the system of equations 
(B22) 
The components of X* are given by 
x,-* = m - a-S o x . * m„. (1 - a, ev ) l x*j i x^ x-| i x-
The following examples illustrate the use of the above procedure 
in evaluating the safety index implied in current design and in 
obtaining the partial safety factors for a specified safety index. 
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EXAMPLE 1 
Evaluate the safety index implied in a steel beam designed according to 
AISC Specifications. Tributary area = A T = 400 ft , code dead load 
(D c) = 50 psf and code live load (L c) = 50 psf. 
L r c = 50(l-p) p = 0.0008 x 400 = 0.32 
= 0.23 (1 + ̂  = 0.23(1 + fjf) = 0.46 
Lrc = 5°0-0.3Z) = 50(0.68) = 34 psf 
,. J- 7* cD Dc + a cL Lrc 1.7 £c(D c + 
F / 
Lrc> . 1.7«.c (50+34) 
36 
= 3.97JJ.C 
Variable Mean COV 
Fy i.w/ 0.10 
z 2* 0.05 
p 1.02 0.06 
E 1.00 0.05 
A 1.00 0.04 
D Dc 0.04 
B 1.00 
/ i i 
0.20 
L 
3 + 15,000 
14.9 + ^ 
For Aj = 800 ft 2 mL = 41.88 psf V 0.13 
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Basic Variables F , D, and L 
g = FyZP - c{D + L) 
F y (1.0)(1.02) ^ - 0 - L - 0 
| £ = 1.02 4r = 1-02 x 3.97 = 4.05 
3 r y C 
l f l = - 1 
3D ' 3L ' 
c c = 36 x. l . l o V o . 1 0 2 + 0.05 2 + 0.06 2 = 
F y 
^ a 3F F 
y y 
5.02 Ksi 
= {(4.05)(5.02)W 1(4.05 x 5.02) 2 + 50 2(.05 2 + .04 2 + -042) 
+ 41.882 (.05 2 + .20Z + .13 2 )) 
20.33 
23.06 0.887 
(-1) 50 Vo.052 + 0.042 + 0.042 
23.06 
= -0.1637 







[1.10 F * -0.887 3(5.02)] 1.02 ^ -(50 + 0.16370 x 0.0755 x 50) 
y c 
- (41.88 + 0.434(3 x 0.244 x 41.88) = 0 
Z*/C =3 .97 




Design a steel beam carrying a mean dead load of 50 psf and having an 
influence area of 800 ft for a safety index 6 = 3,5. 
g = F yZP - c(D + L) 
FM.00)(1.02) ̂  - <D + L) = 0 
3F ''^ c ' 30 ' * 3L 
F y 
D L Z*/c 
m i 39.6 50 41.88 
ffi 5.02 3.77 10.20 
1 
a 0 0 0 2.27 
2 
a 0.7302 -0.2359 -0.6408 4.40 
3 a 0.625 -0.153 -0.414 4.47 
4 a 0.903 -0.149 -0.403 4.47 
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Trial 1 
§ ^ = 1.02x2.27 = 2.3154; fjf = -1 ; §1 = -1 
2.3154 x 5.02 2.3154 x5.02 







F * = 39.6 - 0.7302 x 3.5 x 5.02 = 26.77 
D* = 50 + 0.2379 x 3.5 x 3.77 = 53.13 
L* = 41.88 + 0.6408 x 3.5 x 10.20 = 64.76 
26.77 x 1.02 x Z*/c - 53.13 - 64.76 = 0 
Z*/C = 4.318 
Trial 2 
!# = 1.02 x 4.318 = 4.40 
/(4.40 x 5.02) 2 = 3.772 + 10.2 2 = 24.64 
Op = 0.896 ; a D = -0.153 ; a L -0.414 
= 0.7302 
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F * = 39.6 - 0.896 x 3.5 x 5.02 = 23.86 
D* = 50 + 0.153 x 3.5 x 3.77 = 52.02 
L* = 41.88 + 0.414 x 3.5 x 10.20 = 56.66 
(23.86 x 1.02 x Z*/c) - 52.02 - 56.66 = 0 
Z*/c =4.47 
Trial 3 
| £ = 1.02 x 4.47 = 4.56 
y 
7(4.56 x 5.02) 2 + 3.772 + 10.2 2 = 25.34 
a F y = 0.903 F * = 39.6 - 0.903 x 3.5 x 5.02 = 23.73 
a D = -0.149 D* = 50 + 0.149 x 3.5 x 3.77 = 51.97 
a L = -0.403 L* = 4 1 . 8 8 + 0 . 4 0 3 x 3 . 5 x 1 0 . 2 0 = 5 6 . 3 
23.73 x 1.02 Z*/c - 51.97 - 56.30 = 0 
Z*/c =4.47 
v D = 1.04 
\>L = 1.34 
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B.3 Calibration 
The safety index p, is the central parameter in the second moment 
probabilistic formats. !n order to develop a consistent set of 
design criteria (i.e., load and resistance factors), the value 
of f, must be specified. It can be a value agreed upon by the 
profession to give the desired level of reliability, or it can be 
obtained by selecting the value of B such that the same degree of 
reliability is attained in the new criterion as in the existing 
design method for a number of standard design situations, e.g., 
simple beams, centrally loaded columns, tension members, high 
strength bolts and fillet welds. The latter procedure is called 
"calibration." It has the advantage of utilizing past experience 
and is based on the precept that the reliabilities inherent in 
current criteria for "standard" design situations are acceptable. 
The concept of code calibration has been used in the past in 
developing the load factor design criteria for bridges by AASHC. 
A 40 ft. span bridge was taken as the "standard" design situation; 
the load factors were derived such that the new designs match the 
designs by the allowable stress method for this "standard" span. 
Code calibration as a mathematical problem of adjusting the 
parameters of a code to achieve a stated objective was first formally 
proposed by Lind (1968). This concept has been applied extensively 
in most probabilistic code development work. 
B.4 Load and Resistance Factor Design 1LRFD) 
In this section we will describe the development of load and resis­
tance factor design criteria for steel (hot and cold formed) using 
a second moment probabilistic format. The objective is to illus­
trate the code calibration procedure and to demonstrate that 
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practical design rules can be derived using probabilistic formats. 
The major phases of the design criteria development are also 
discussed. 
The load and resistance factor design criterion is expressed by 
the following ge.teral formula (Gaiambos, Ravindra, et al, 1978}: 
.1 
n - k=l k Qk 
The left side of the formula relytes to the resistance (capacity) 
of the structure while the right side characterizes the loading 
acting on it. 
The resistance side of the design criterion consists of the 
product $ R , in which R is the "nominal resistance: and <j> is 
the "resistance factor". The nominal resistance is the resistance 
computed according to a formula in a structural code and it is 
based on nominal material and cross-sectional properties. The 
resistance factcr <p , which is always less than unity, together 
with R reflects the uncertainties associated with R. The n 
factor <(> is dimensionlcss and R -> a generalized fGrce: bending 
moment, axial force, or shear force associated with a limit state 
of strength or serviceability. 
The loading side of the design criterion (Eq. B23) is the sum of 
products y m 0, in which m Q is the "mean load effect", and Y is 
the corresponding "lead factor". Here t is dimensionTess and 
iru is a generalized force (i.e., bending moment, axial force 
or shear force) computed for mean loads for which the structure 
is to be designed. The Y-factors reflect potential overloads 
and the uncertainties inherent in the calculation of the load 
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effects. The summation sign in Eq. B23 denotes the combination 
of load effects from different load sources. For example, if only 
dead load and live load effects are considered 
2> \'- YD \ ; \ \ 'w 
k=l 
in which nu and m n are the mean dead and live load efftcts, 
respectively; >'n and y. are the corresponding load fpctors. 
In the LRFD, one expression of the type given in Eq. B24 is derived 
for each set of load combinations that need to be considered. 
The nominal resistance always relates to a specific "limit state". 
Two classes of limit states are pertinent to sttuctural design: 
the "maximum strength: (or "ultimate") limit state and the 
"serviceability" limit state. Violation of a strength limit state 
implies "failure" in the sense that a clearly defined limit of 
structural usefulness has been exceeded, but this does not necessar­
ily involve actual collapse. In the case of a structural system with 
"compact" beams this means that a plastic mechanism has formed. 
Other strength limit states for steel structures are: frame in­
stability, lateral torsional or local instability, incremental 
collapse, etc. Serviceability limit states include exceptive 
deflection, excessive vibration, and premature yield or slip. 
The objective of one LRFD project was to develop the design criteria 
shown in Eq. 825 for different structural steel dements under a 
number of load combinations in a consistent way, taking into account 
the inherent uncertainties of the resistances and load effects. 
The following second moment probabilistic format (Rosenblueth and 
6. 
Esteva, 1971) was used to determine the values of <ji and y 
In this format, the safety index B is defined as 
... (B25) 
The resistance H nf a structural element is expressed as: 
R = RpMFP (B26) 
in which R = the nominal code specified resistance and R, M, 
F, and P are random variables. The dimensions of R are limit 
state moments, axial forces or shears, and M, F and P are thus 
nondimensional. The product form of Eq. B26 was chosen for illustra­
tion because many relationships in steel design are of this form. 
It was assumed that the random variables M, F and P are uncorreiated. 
The coefficient of variation of the resistance, V R, is written 
approximately as: 
VR * K + V F + V P ( B 2 7 ) 
in which VY., Vp, and V p are the coefficients of variation of M, 
F and P respectively. 
The random variable M represents the variation in material strength 
or stiffness. The statistical parameters, m„ and v\, may be 
obtained by routine tests. The random variable F characterizes 
the uncertainties in "fabrication". The term "fabrication" includes 
the variations in geometrical properties introduced by rolling, 
fabrication tolerances, initial distortions, welding tolerances, 
erection variations, and the like. The variations are the 
differences between the ideal designed member and the member in 
the structure after erection. 
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The random variable P, called the "professional" factor, reflects 
the uncertainties of the assumptions used in determining the 
resistance from "design" models. These uncertainties could be 
the result of using approximations for theoretically exact 
formulas, or of the assumptions such as perfect elasticity, perfect 
plasticity, homogeneity, or "beam" theory instead of the "theory 
of elasticity". Comparisons between "design" predictions and 
test results, or between "design" predictions and approximate or 
exact theoretical formulas could be used to estimate the values 
of m and V . 
The load effect, 0, refers to the strength limit state that is 
examined. It is assumed here that only dead and live load effects 
are present. Other load combinations are studied later. 
The load effect Q for combined dead and live gravity loading is 
modeled as: 
Q = E(c DAD + c LBL) (B28) 
where D and L are random variables representing dead and live 
load intensities, respectively; c D and c, are deterministic 
influence coefficients that transform the load intensities to 
load effects (e.g., moment, shear and axial force); A and B are 
random variables reflecting the uncertainties in the transformation 
of loads into load effects; and E is a random variable representing 
the uncertainties in structural analysis. The corresponding mean 
values are m 0, m,, m», RU and m E and the coefficients of variation 
are V D, V. , V., Vg and V E respectively. 
In t!.i; load combination, the live load of interest is the maximum 
live load that occurs in the lifetime of the structure. The random 
variables D and L include the uncertainties in idealizing the loads 
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which vary randomly in time and space. The random variables A 
and B account for the uncertainties in the transformation of 
idealized design loads into load effects such as moments, shears, 
and axial forces. Their variation characterizes the differences 
between actual and computed internal forces in the structure. 
The variable E includes the uncertainties in modeling a three-
dimensional real structure of complex geometry and behavior into 
a set of members and connection of fixed geometry and stipulated 
behavior. It also accounts for the uncertainties induced by 
approximate or simplified structural analysis in lieu of complicated 
refined theories (e.g., assumption of inflexion points, spring-
mass systems in vibration analysis). 
The mean and the coefficient of variation of Q are derived as: 
mQ = CD mA "to + CL m 6 mL ^ B 2 9 ) 
and 
V , / y 2 , C D^< V A 2 * 4> * Wl^l + V L > ( B 3 Q ) 
Q " E ^ V D + c L m B m L ) 2 
The mean value of E is assumed to be unity in Eqs. 28 and 29. 
Using the expression for R and Q and applying the linear approx­
imation (Eq. 12), the LRFD cr i ter ion is derived as: 
exp(- agVR)mR >_ exp (a 8VE) [{1 + aB/V^ + V D 2 ) cnmD 
+ (1 + ae / V B 2 + V L 2 ) C |_mL)] (B31) 
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in which «= 0-55 gives a good approximation between Eqs.B31 and 
B25 determined by an er ror minimization process. Therefore, 
the resistance and load factors are given by 
mR 
* = exp (- aeVR) f- (B32) 
yZ = exp (a3VE) (B33) 
Yn = 1 + oS / v . 2 + VD2 
D A U (B34) 
\ - 1 + « S / V B 2 + V L 2 { B 3 5 ) 
These factors can be evaluated for any given value of the safety 
index 6 . The spec i f i ca t ion of 6 is done through " c a l i b r a t i o n " 
to the current AISC spec i f icat ions and is i l l u s t r a t e d herein fo r 
simple beams. 
A simply supported beam under uni formly d i s t r i bu ted dead and l i v e 
loads, adequately braced and "compact" w i l l require a p las t i c 
modulus Z given by 
1.7 [ c n D r + c . L ( l - p ) ] 
Z = — "• c • ? - - c (B36) 
h y 
in which F = the specified minimum yield stress of the grade 
of steel used, c n and c, are the influencing coefficients equal 
to SK.2/8 (where s = the beam spacing and i - the span). The 
code specified dead load is D , L is the uniformly distributed 
code live load intensity specified ANSI A58.1 - 1972 for the type 
of occupancy and p is the live load reduction factor given by 
p = 0 for A T <_ 150 sft 
= 0.0008 A T for 150 A T <_ 750 sft (837) 
= 0.60 for A T > 750 sft 
or p = 0.23 (1 + Dc/L ) 
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whichever is smaller. The tributary area is A. 
A value of Scan be obtained by selecting a "standard" design 
situation and requiring that the LRFD criterion produce the same 
design (i.e., the same plastic section modulus) as the AISC 
specification. Instead of limiting the calibration to one 
preselected data point, a complete spectrum of design situations, 
characterized by different tributary areas and dead loads was 
studied in the LRFD project in order to select a representative 
value of e . 
The safety index B was computed from Eq. B25 for the plastic modulus 
1 which was required by the AISC specification. The mean resistance 
m R is equal to 
mR = m Z m F "V test N ( B 3 8 ) 
y Iprediction/ 
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The values of the mean and the coefficient of variation of the 
variables identified earlier are: 
m z = z V F = 0.05 
m F = 1 - 0 5 F y V M = 0 -
111 [Test \= 1.02 V p = 0.06 ^Prediction) 
m E = 1.0; m A = 1.0; m D = D c; m B = 1.0 
V E = 0.05; V A = 0.04; V D = 0.04; V g = 0.20 
763 m L = 14.9 + - ^ - ; v = AT72 + 7500/AT 
^ 2 A T L 14.9 + 763//2£f 
The variation of g for different values of D and A T is shown in 
Fig. B-4. It was concluded from this study that B = 3.0 is a 
representative value for the safety index implied in the design 
of simply supported beams using Part 2 of the 1969 AISC specifi­
cation. Calibrations were also performed for centrally loaded 
columns and for high strength bolts and fillet welds. The 
conclusion of the calibration studies was that B = 3.0 and S = 4.5 
were to be selected for members and for connectors respectively 
as the basis for developing load factors and resistance factors. 
With the numerical values of the mean and the coefficients of 
variation chosen previously and the safety index 6 = 3.0, the 
LRFD criterion for the plastic design of simply supported steel 
beams becomes: 
0.86 ZF >_ 1.1 [c Dm D + c Lm L] (B39) 
The resistance factors for beams, columns, beam-columns, plate 
guiders, composite beams and connectors have been derived. 
(Galambo and Ravindra et al - 1978) 
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Load Factors have been derived for the load combinations formu­
lated using Turkstra's rule. 
D,-100 Hi -- S*~ -**' 
^ - ? 
llferil'T if*. T-lJjI^IlT' 
Figure B-4. Variations of Safety Index for Simple 
Steel Beams Implied in Part 2, AISC Specification 
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The load combinations are: 
Dead Load + Lifetime Max. Live Load 
4>Rn >_ 1.1 tl.lc Dm D + 1.4 c Lm L] <B40) 
Dead Load + Sustained Live + Lifetime Max. Wind Load 
* Rn I 1-1 t 1 , 1 c D m D + 2 , ° c L m L S + 1 - 6 CA^ * B 4 1 ) 
Lifetime Max. Wind Load + Dead Load 
4>Rn >. 1.1 [1.6 c ^ + 0.9 c nm 0] (B42) 
Dead Load + Sustained Live Load + Lifetime Max. Snow Load 
* R n I '-0 H.1 c nm n + 2.0 cLro,s+ 1.7 c sm s ] (B43) 
The major phases of the Load and Resistance Factor Design Project were: 
1. Collection of data on load and resistance variables. 
2. Calibration studies to derive safety index values. 
3. Development of load and resistance factors. 
4. Design office studies and criteria development. 
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The LRFD project has shown that practical design rules can be 
developed using probabilistic formats. Similar studies have been 
performed for cold formed steel (Yu and Galambos, 1979), and 
for concrete (Ellingwood, 1979). 
B.5 Load Combination Studies 
Most current building codes recommend a load reduction factor 
when two or more time-varying loads are to be combined. The 
reasoning behind this reduction factor (or increase in allowable 
stress) is that the probability of two or more maximum load inten­
sities occurring simultaneously is small. The value of the reduc­
tion factor (or "one-third" increase in the allowable stress) is 
largely based on judgment. Any such factor should be based on the 
probability of the design combined loading being exceeded in the life 
of the structure. This probability can be assessed by considering 
the random occurrences, duration and intensities of different loads. 
A complete treatment of loads as random processes is conceptually 
appealing but is computationally extremely difficult. 
Recognizing this aspect of computational difficulties and the 
need for practical design rules, Turkstra (1972) proposed a 
procedure for finding the maximum combined load effect over the 
lifetime of the structure. He postulated that when one of the 
loads in the combination is at its lifetime maximum, the other 
loads will be at their arbitrary point-in-time values. Using 
this postulate, the lifetime maximum wind load would for example 
be combined with the sustained live load. By checking a number 
of such load combinations, one can ascertain that the maximum 
combined load effect from all loads is included in the design. 
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Recent work in the load combination area has focussed on assessing 
the probability of the maximum combined load effect, S . Based 
on the load coincidence, Wen (1977) has derived the following 
expression for the cumulative probability distribution of S . 
m 
F, (s,T) ; exp 
5m 
N N N \ 
7 = 1 1 n i/j ^ ^ i|*jA 1 J k n J k ) 
fR44) 
in which u, = mean occurrence rate of only load 
X;j(t}, v.-,Vj.. = mean occurrence rates of coincidence of only 
X^t) and X.(t), and only X.(t), X-(t) and Xfc(t) respectively. 
P., P.., P.., are conditional probabilities of S exceeding s i ij ijK m 
given the occurrence of load X.(t) alone, the coincidence of only 
loads X,(t) and X.(t) and the coincidence of X.(t), X.(t) and X.(t), 
1 J 1 j K 
respectively, v. >v.. and v... are given in terms of A. and A,., 
< 1J • J K 1 u I 
the mean occurrence rate and mean duration of Toad X.(t). 
larrabee and Cornell (1979) have proposed an approximation to the 
probability of S exceeding s in T as: 
1 - F, (s.t) v v q +(s)T (B45) 
where v s(t) is the mean upcrossing rate of the sum of Poisson 
renewal pulse processes, for the case of sum of two processes, 
v s +(s) = ( f x (x) v x + (s-x) dx + | f x (x) v x +(S-x)dx 
in which X-,, X? are arbitrary point-in-time values and v„ , v„ 
are upcrossing rates of processes X,(t) and X 2 ( t ) . 
(B46) 
Approximate methods for the estimation of the first two moments 
of s j t ; 
(1978). 
S ( t ) have been suggested by Wen (1977) and Der Kiureghian 
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B.6 Levels of Probabilistic Design Codes 
Many researchers (Rosenblueth, 1972; Rackwitz, 1976) have advo­
cated the adoption of probabilistic design procedures at a grad­
uated pace. They have identified four levels of probabilistic 
design: 
Level I: A design method in which appropriate levels of relia­
bility are provided on a structural element basis by the specifi­
cation of a number of partial safety factors and load combinations, 
e.g., LRFD. 
Level II: A design method requiring safety checks at selected 
points on the failure boundary. Reliability levels are defined by 
safety indices. An example of this design method is the iterative 
procedure suggested by Rackwitz (see Section B,2) 
Level III: A design method wherein the structural elements or 
systems are designed to specified failure probabilities. 
Level IV: A design method wherein the structural system is 
designed to minimize the total expected cost; the total expected 
cost is defined as the initial cost plus the product of tost of 
failure and the probability of failure summed over all failure 
modes. 
While the levels II, III and IV are useful for research, they 
are not practical for routine design. Level I method with the 
specified set of partial safety factors is most appropriate for 
this purpose. The code writers may use the results of studies 
with the higher level (II, III and IV) design methods in specifying 
the partial safety factors for level I method. 
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B.7 Ode Optimization 
The need for deterministic coaes to perform the probabilistic 
design of structures has been emphasized by Lind (1968). 
Specification of the partial safety factors in a deterministic 
code format can be done whatever be the underlying probabil st ic 
model (Lind - 1976) Fig. D-5 is a schematic diagram that s• ows how 
the code writers can process the results of the second moment 
analysis, f u l l structural system re l i ab i l i t y analysis an of the 
expected cost optimization to obtain practical load factor type 
equations. The tools needed for this transformation are calibra­
tion and code optimization (fiavindra and Lind -1973). Tht partial 
safety factors—code parameters—can be derived by matching the 
safety indices or re l iab i l i t i es implied by the level I design code 
to the desired value of 6 or probability of fa i lu r or by 
minimizing the total expected costs over the set f a l l "future" 
designs. In the set-theoretical formulation of aesign codes 
this problem of code parameter selection is reduced to one of 
nonlinear mathematical programming. 
This concept has been employed by Lind and Irs associates (Siu, 
Pariroi and Lind -1975, Nowak and Lind -1979 for developing the 
l im i t states design cr i ter ia for the National Building Code of 
Canada. The l im i t states design cr i ter ior is expressed as: 
*Rn •-. JDD + ui|/.fyLL + YW  (or Y £ E ; + YT  I (B47) 
<t> = resistance factor for each mateial and l imi t state 
R = nominal resistance of the structural element 
a) = importance factor to account for the use and occupancy of the 
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Figure B-5. Deterministic Format for Probabilistic Design 
Y D ' \ ' Y E ' 'W Y T ~ ̂ oac' factors on the nominal load D, L, E, 
W and T. 
X = combination factor to account for the reduced probability 
of simultaneous occurrence of maximum loads. X = 1.00 
for one load in the brackets; X = 0.70 for two loads and 
X = 0.60 for three loads within the brackets. 
0 YQ, Y^> Yy> Y£> TTI QJ and X are selected using calibration to 
current design codes for different materials. 
(1) For each limit state for the structural material (e.g., 
cold formed steel under yielding), the safety index values implied 
in the code for all design situations (known as points in data 
space) are calculated. A design situation is characterized by a set 
of particular values.Jor the ratios of dead to live loads and wind 
to dead loads. The value of safety index 6 is determined by using 
Eq. B25. A weighted average value of safety box index, B a„ , 
a vg 
is found fo r the s t ructura l material fo r the l i m i t s tate under con­
s iderat ion 
Save, = £ f i B i (B48) 
where f. is the weighing factor based on the frequency of occur­
rence of the specific design situation. 
(2) From an analysis of the B values for different materials 
avg 
under different limit states, select representative "target" S 
values for different limit states as constants for all structural 
members, e.g., flexural and tension, S = 4,00; compression, 
B = 4.75; and shear, B = 4.25. 
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The evaluation of <t>, Y n » \ ' Y w » • 
the code optimization procedure. 
. . is carried out by using 
For a selected set of 
WV' and 0 and for a given material under a part i­cular l im i t state, f ind the implied value of the safety index, 
denoted b, for the new code at a given data point. An objective 
function in terms of the residuals is formulated as 
Si = T, T. Z (e-b)2 f (B49) 
matls l im i t data 
state space 
The minimization of 52 results in optimal values of Y D > \ > Y W > 
and <j>. 
(4) The above procedure has been applied to derive the optimal 
values of fourteen code parameters including three load factors 
(YD,Y. , and Yy) and eleven resistance factors for the following 
materials and l imi t states: 
Hot-rolled steel; Yielding 
Compression 
Reinforced concrete: Flexure 
Compression 
Shear 
Wood: Flexure and tension 
Compression parallel to grain 
Compression perpendicular to grain 
Shear 
Buckling 
Cold-formed steel: Yielding 
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With these code parameters, the design criteria become: 
a n d « R > 1.25D + 1.50L ( B 5 0 ) 
*R > '.250 + 1.70O.50L + 1.50W) 
Resistance Factors: (a) Cold formed steel - yielding (*, = 
0.90); (b) hot-rolled steel - yielding (<f>, = 0.85) and 
compression (#. = 0.74); (c) reinforced concrete - flexure 
( ^ = 0.83); compression (0 g = 0.68), and shear ( ^ = 0.64); 
and (d) wood - flexure (*, = 0.92), compression parallel to 
grain (tfu = 0.76); compression perpendicular to grain (tf_ = 0.64), 
shear ( * 1 Q = 0.90), and buckling (^^ = 0.70). 
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